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Abstract: In this letter we assert that we have reconstructed the nonlinear filter 
function of LILI-128 stream cipher on IBM notebook PC using MATLAB. Our 
reconstruction need approximately 1312 2~2 bits and the attack consumes 5825.016 sec 
(using tic and toc sentences of MATLAB) or 5825.016/3600=1.6181hours. We got the 
expression of the nonlinear filter function  of Lili-128 which has 46 items from 
liner items to nonlinear items based on complexity, the phase space reconstruction, 
Clustering and nonlinear prediction. We have verified our reconstruction result 
correctness by simulating the overview of Lili-128 keystream generators using our 
getting  and implement designers’ reference module of the Lili-128 stream cipher, 
and two methods produce the same synchronous keystream sequence on same initial 
state, so that our research work proves that the nonlinear filter function of LILI-128 
stream cipher is successfully reconstructed. 
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1. Introduction  
 
LILI-128 stream cipher is designed by Dawson, Clark, Golic, Millan, Penna and 
Simpson[1], and submitted to NESSIE as a candidate cipher. Because the keystream 
sequence are a long period around 2128, high linear complexity which is conjectured to 
be at least 268, and good statistics regarding the distribution of zeroes and ones, so 
designers assert that the LILI-128 keystream generator can resist currently known 
styles of attack. Some methods[2-5] of breaking it have been proposed, since 
LILI-128 stream cipher was publicized in 2000. The methods have already been 
shown that attack the LILI-128 stream cipher more efficiently than an exhaustive 
search for its secret key. However most of the attack methods consider only the 
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complexity of time or memory for search for its secret key. For example, Time- 
Memory Tradeoff Attack[2] needs approximately 246 bits, and Correlation Attack[3] 
needs approximately about 223 bits. While Algebraic Attack [4] needs approximately 
218 bits. Even a new attack method[5] requires a mere 27 bits of keystream. But this 
attack methods needs large memory and computations. For example, the paper[5] 
needs 299.1 computations. In 2005, designers summarize all published styles of attack 
on the LILI-II stream cipher, and assert that LILI-II remains unbroken[6]. They 
encourage further analysis of the LILI-II stream cipher.  
Section Ⅱ of this paper describes the structure of LILI-128. Section Ⅲ give the 
expression of the nonlinear filter function df . Section Ⅳ verifies the correctness of the 
expression of the nonlinear filter function df . We give the conclusion of this paper in 
Section Ⅴ. 
 
Ⅱ. The structure of LILI-128 
 
The structure of the LILI-128 keystream generators is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
generator can be divided into two subsystems based on the functions they perform: 
the clock control subsystem and data generation subsystem. The clock control 
subsystem produces an integer sequence that is used to control the clocking of the 
second subsystem. The feedback polynomial of the LFSRc is chosen to be the 
primitive polynomial 
1)( 214151731333539 ++++++++= xxxxxxxxxGc              (1) 
Since  is primitive, the LFSR)(xGc c produces a maximum-length sequence of 
period . The function  takes two bits as input and produced an integer 
, such that 
1239 −=cP cf
kc { }4,3,2,1∈kc . The value of kc  is calculated as   
.1,12),( 2121 ≥++== kyyyyfc ck                     (2) 
The LFSRd is clocked by  at least once and at most four times between the output 
of consecutive bits. The feedback polynomial of LFSR
kc
d is given as follows: 
1)( 39425355808389 ++++++++= xxxxxxxxxGd               (3) 
Since is a primitive polynomial, a period of )(xGd 12
89 −  at maximum is 
guaranteed for LFSRd output sequence. The contents of 10 different stages of LFSRd 
are input to a nonlinear filter function . The output of  is the keystream 
sequence.  
df df
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Figure 1  Overview of LILI-128 keystream generators    
 
Ⅲ. The expression of the nonlinear filter function  df
 
The designers publicize all the structure of the clock control subsystem and the 
most part structure of the data generation subsystem. They do not publicize the 
expression of the nonlinear filter function  in the data generation subsystemdf . The 
aim which we attack LILI-128 is the expression of the nonlinear filter function . Up 
to now, all attacks explain only that LILI-128 has lower complexity as designers claim, 
and do not get the expression of the nonlinear filter function . We get a reference 
module of LILI-128 from the Information Security Institute’s webpage: 
df
df
http://www.isi.qut.edu.au/resources/lili/. We implement the reference module by using 
ASCII initial value“yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy”. First, we determine the least keystream bit 
amount of expressing the nonlinear filter function  from the LILI-128 kystream 
sequence by means of measuring the complexity of the LILI-128 kystream sequence. 
The least key stream bit amount of expressing the nonlinear filter function  is not 
equal for differ initial state. The least keystream bit amount is 
approximately
df
df
1312 2~2 bits. We reconstruct the phase space diagram of the 10 
dimensions: (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) from least keystream bit amount, and got the 
nonlinear filter function  of Lili-128 which has 46 items from liner items to 
nonlinear items by clustering and nonlinear prediction under ASCII initial 
value“yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy”. The nonlinear filter function is expressed as follows: 
df
df
 
 
 
  K=2                       n=10 
        …                        …            
                      C(t)                           Z(t)  
 
 
Clock Control            Data Generation 
LFSRc LFSRd 
fc fd 
fd = x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x10 * x6 + x10 * x4 + x9 * x3 + x9 * x1 + x8 * x2 + x8 * x1 + x7 * x6  + 
x10 * x9 * x5 + x10 * x9 * x4 + x10 * x9 * x3 + x10 * x9 * x2 + x10 * x8 * x4 + x10 * x8 * x3 + x10 
 3
* x7 * x6 + x10 * x7 * x5 + x10 * x7 * x4 + x9 * x8 * x6 + x9 * x8 * x3 + x9 * x7 * x6 + x9 * x7 * 
x4 + x9 * x7 * x3 + x10 * x9 * x8 * x6 + x10 * x9 * x8 * x4 + x10 * x9 * x8* x3 + x10 * x9 * x8* x1 
+ x10 * x9 * x7 * x6 + x10 * x9 * x7 * x4 + x10 * x9 * x7 * x2 + x10 * x8 * x7 * x5 + x10 * x8  * 
x7 * x3 + x9 * x8 * x7 * x4 + x9 * x8 * x7 * x2 + x9 * x7 * x6 * x5 + x9 * x7 * x6 * x4 + x10* x9 * 
x8 * x7 * x4 + x10 * x9 * x8 * x7 * x3 + x10 * x9 * x7 * x6 * x5 + x10 * x9 * x7 * x6 * x4 + x9 * x8 
* x7 * x6 * x5 + x9 * x8 * x7 * x6 * x4 + x10 * x9 * x8 * x7 * x6 * x5 +x10 * x9 * x8 * x7 * x6 * x4
 (4) 
 
The 10 inputs to are taken from LFSRdf d positions according to this full positive 
difference set: (0,1,3,7,12,20,30,44,65,80)[1] in the LILI-128, so we can map the 
set:(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) into the set:(0,1,3,7,12,20,30,44,65,80), and get another   
expression of the nonlinear filter function .  df
             
Ⅳ. Verifying the correctness for the expression of the nonlinear filter function  df
 
If we describe LILI-128 keystream generator by MATLAB, the stages of LFSRc 
be labeled s[1], s[2],…,s[39] from left to right. At every time, we have the following 
formula to calculate the feedback bit: 
w=s[38]⊕s[26]⊕s[25]⊕s[23]⊕s[9]⊕s[7]⊕s[5]⊕s[1] 
where ⊕ indicates the addition modulo 2. Let the LFSRc shift left, and s[38]=w. 
Sequentially circulating and calculating, the LFSRc will produce a linear 
pseudorandom sequence. The function is given by  cf
                                            (5) 
The stages of LFSRd be labeled u[1], u[2],…,u[89] from left to right. At time t, the 
feedback bit is calculated by the following formula  
w=u[89]⊕u[51]⊕u[48]⊕u[37]⊕u[35]⊕u[10]⊕u[7]⊕s[1] 
where ⊕ indicates the addition modulo 2. Let the LFSRd shift left, and u[89]=w. 
According to above circulation, the LFSRcd will produce a linear pseudorandom 
sequence. We map the set: (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) into the set: 
(1,2,4,8,13,21,31,45,66,81), the is given by: df
fd = x13 + x8 + x4 + x2 + x81 * x21 + x81 * x8 + x66 * x4 + x66 * x1 + x45 * x2 + x45 * x1 + x31 * 
x21  + x81 * x66 * x13 + x81 * x66 * x8 + x81 * x66 * x4 + x81 * x66 * x2 + x81 * x45 * x8 + x81 * 
x45 * x4 + x81 * x31 * x21 + x81 * x31 * x13 + x81 * x31 * x8 + x66 * x45 * x21 + x66 * x45 * x4 + 
x66 * x31 * x21 + x66 * x31 * x8 + x66 * x31 * x4 + x81 * x66 * x45 * x21 + x81 * x66 * x45 * x8 + 
x81 * x66 * x45* x4 + x81 * x66 * x45* x1 + x81 * x66 * x31 * x21 + x81 * x66 * x31 * x8 + x81 * 
x66 * x31 * x2 + x81 * x45 * x31 * x13 + x81 * x45  * x31 * x4 + x66 * x45 * x31 * x8 + x66 * x45 * 
x31 * x2 + x66 * x31 * x21 * x13 + x66 * x31 * x21 * x8 + x81* x66 * x45 * x31 * x8 + x81 * x66 * 
x45 * x31 * x4 + x81 * x66 * x31 * x21 * x13 + x81 * x66 * x31 * x21 * x8 + x66 * x45 * x31 * x21 * 
x13 + x66 * x45 * x31 * x21 * x8 + x81 * x66 * x45 * x31 * x21 * x13 +x81 * x66 * x45 * x31 * x21 * 
 4
x8                                                                                            (6)                        
We simulate the keystream sequence of LILI-128 using (6) under the initial values 
which are ASCII “yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy” according to Figure 1. Compare simulating 
result with the result of implementing the reference module, and two methods 
produce the same synchronous keystream sequence on same initial state 
“yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy”. We continue to verify the nonlinear filter function again by 
initial state “ggggggggggggggg” and “123456789abcdefg”, and obtain all the same 
synchronous keystream sequence, so that the verifying work indicates that we have 
got the nonlinear filter function of the LILI-128 stream cipher. 
df
      
Ⅴ. Conclusion  
 
In the design of LILI-128, Designers made an attempt to confuse the linear 
pseudorandom binary sequence with the long period Pc=289-1 by the clock-control 
with the long period Pc=239-1 and get high linear complexity of keystream sequence 
through the nonlinear filter function  with 46 items and the most algebraic order 
of 6 to withstand all kinds of currently known attack. The LILI-128 keystream 
generator certainly resists currently known styles of attack, but it does not withstand 
our attack. The currently known styles of attack based on time complexity and 
memory complexity of arithmetic. The attacks do not consider the complexity of 
keystream sequence oneself. We get the least bit amount of the attack by measuring 
the complexity of the keystream sequence of LILI-128 and the nonlinear filter 
function from the least keystream bit amount by the phase space reconstruction, 
Clustering and nonlinear prediction. We will research the secret key from keystream 
sequence of LILI-128. Our research work has made a great breakthrough in stream 
cipher analysis, and will bring the importance influence on stream cipher design. We 
only publish our research result and do not explain the specific theory and algorithm 
of attacking the nonlinear filter function of LILI-128 stream cipher. Reader can verify 
the  in Eq.(4) first of all. And then is redesigned, the stream cipher sequence of 
LILI-128 output is obtained by simulating Figure 1 using a ASCII initial state. Reader 
can sends the ASCII initial state and the stream cipher sequence which length is 2
df
df
df df
13 
bits to us. We will return to him.   df
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